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IS THE UNITED STATES BECOMING THE “NEW 
SWITZERLAND”?:  WHY THE UNITED STATES’ FAILURE 
TO ADOPT THE OECD’S COMMON REPORTING 
STANDARD IS HELPING IT BECOME A TAX HAVEN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The fight against tax evasion, and subsequently tax havens, has 
been an ongoing battle for at least a century.1  In modern times, tax eva-
sion costs the world’s economies billions of dollars annually,2 and since 
the 2008 financial crisis, curbing tax evasion has become a political pri-
ority.3  Efforts to police offshore tax evasion include bilateral treaties4 
and prosecution of suspect foreign financial institutions, notably by the 
United States.5  Furthermore, international programs sponsored by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
seek to promote transnational financial transparency.6 
The most recent and promising development in the war on tax 
evasion is the participation in and implementation of the Automatic Ex-
change of Information (“AEOI”) program by more than 100 
 
 1. See Sébastien Guex, The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law and Its Reper-
cussions for Swiss Federal Policy, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 237, 240–42 (2000) (describing the 
French and Belgian attempts to curb the flux of capital from their countries to the haven of 
Switzerland during the early 1900’s). 
 2. Niall McCarthy, Tax Avoidance Costs the U.S. Nearly $200 Billion Every Year, 
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccar-
thy/2017/03/23/tax-avoidance-costs-the-u-s-nearly-200-billion-every-year-info-
graphic/#64af0b272f0d. 
 3. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of 
the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 65, 66 (2014). 
 4. See id. (discussing the use of treaties as a major policy instrument in the fight against 
tax evasion). 
 5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Aff., United States and Switzer-
land Issue Joint Statement Regarding Tax Evasion Investigations (Aug. 2013) (on file with 
author) (describing investigations by the United States of Swiss banks believed to be assisting 
United States clients in committing tax evasion). 
 6. See generally OECD, EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, http://www.oecd.org/tax/ex-
change-of-tax-information/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (“Exchange of information is about 
achieving global tax co-operation through the implementation of international tax standards 
and other instruments to put an end to bank secrecy and tackle tax evasion.”). 
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“jurisdictions”7 around the globe.8  Of the more than 100 committed 
countries and territories participating in the AEOI, the most notable ab-
sentee is the United States.9  The refusal of the United States to participate 
raises questions regarding the AEOI’s potential for success.10  Global im-
plementation is essential to accomplishing AEOI’s goal of eradicating tax 
evasion.11  Without the support of the United States, it is difficult to gauge 
how successful the AEOI can hope to be and furthermore how important 
ending tax evasion worldwide is to the United States.12 
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II provides background 
information on the U.S. crackdown on offshore tax evasion and the inter-
national standards relating to tax transparency.13  Part III14 argues that the 
only way for the AEOI to be successful is through global, and thus U.S., 
 
 7. “Jurisdictions” is the term almost always used by the OECD to describe countries, 
territories, and dependencies committed to participation in its international programs. Juris-
dictions is not a legal term of art in this context. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON 
TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, AEOI: STATUS OF 
COMMITMENTS, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2019) (identifying countries as well as territories and non-sovereign states as jurisdic-
tions committed to the implementation of AEOI). 
 8. OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE PORTAL, MAJOR ENLARGEMENT OF THE GLOBAL 
NETWORK FOR THE AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF OFFSHORE ACCOUNT INFORMATION AS OVER 100 




 9. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS, SECOND EDITION (Mar. 27, 2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-account-information-in-tax-matters-second-edition-9789264267992-en.htm (show-
ing the interactive map of participating jurisdictions in the AEOI and the non-commitment of 
the United States).   
 10. See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR 
TAX PURPOSES, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2018), [hereinafter GLOBAL FORUM 
ON TRANSPARENCY], http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/automaticexchangeofinfor-
mation.htm (explaining that global implementation is essential to effectively tackle evasion 
and ensure that jurisdictions are on an even footing). 
 11. Id.; see also Martha O’Brien, International Developments in Exchange of Tax Infor-
mation, in CAN BANKS STILL KEEP A SECRET? BANK SECRECY IN FINANCIAL CENTRES AROUND 
THE WORLD 134, 159 (Sandra Booysen & Dora Neo, Cambridge Univ. Press) (2017) (“To be 
effective, however, [AEOI] must be universal or near universal, so that the hiding places are 
obvious because they are so few.”). 
 12. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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adoption and implementation.15  Part IV16 discusses the juxtaposition be-
tween the United States’ official stance on tax havens and its own pro-
clivity to become one and provides recommendations on how the United 
States can implement the AEOI.17  Part V18 concludes by recommending 
that the United States adopt the AEOI for the betterment of the global 
economy and stop the downward spiral that has already begun to make it 
the next big tax haven.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.       The U.S. Crackdown on Offshore Tax Evasion 
While U.S. taxpayers, or rather tax evaders, have been taking ad-
vantage of offshore accounts for decades, the United States Internal Rev-
enue Service (“IRS”) has historically had little success prosecuting these 
individuals and retrieving the lost revenue.20  Then, in 2008 and 2009, the 
IRS and United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) pursued a series of 
high-profile prosecutions21 that many praised as breakthroughs in the 
U.S. fight against tax evasion.22  In particular, the United States’ case 
against UBS AG (“UBS”), Switzerland’s largest bank, made headlines as 
 
 15. See Enzo de Vicentes, The U.S. Hasn’t Signed the AEoI Agreement: Reciprocity De-
manded, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@icoservices/usa-aeoi-agreement-rec-
iprocity-demanded-868ee4ae3dc6 (explaining the problem with the U.S. relying solely on 
FATCA because of the lack of reciprocity and U.S. accountability the act creates). 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing 
Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Leveling the Playing Field]; but see Craig Rose, The Biggest Tax 
Haven of Them All? The U.S., FATCA and the CRS, BLOOMBERG LAW: INT’L TAX BLOG (Mar. 
29, 2016), https://www.bna.com/biggest-tax-haven-b57982069147/. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See Rose, supra note 17 (arguing that FATCA does not require the U.S. to recipro-
cally share financial information with the countries it is receiving financial information from, 
thereby making the U.S. a prime market for foreigners seeking to hide assets offshore). 
 20. See J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA 
and its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 473 (2012) (explaining that the IRS has histor-
ically had little success pursuing hidden income). 
 21. See Stephen Troiano, The U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Impact on Tax 
Havens, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 333–346 (2011) (providing an in-depth anal-
ysis of the U.S. case against UBS and Swiss banking secrecy). 
 22. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Aff., UBS Enters into Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter UBS Deferred Pros-
ecution Agreement] (describing the agreement as a “milestone” in the effort to ensure fairness 
in tax transparency and stating that “[t]he veil of secrecy has been pulled aside”). 
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the first time the United States pursued both civil and criminal charges 
against a Swiss bank for tax evasion and securities violations.23 
In February 2009, UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agree-
ment with the DOJ on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States 
by impeding the IRS.24  The charges alleged that after agreeing to report 
certain information to the IRS about UBS clients from the United States, 
UBS evaded the reporting requirements by helping its United States cli-
ents open new accounts in the names of sham entities that would not iden-
tify the United States client as the beneficiary.25  These methods allowed 
UBS to avoid its reporting requirements and helped its United States cli-
ents to conceal both their identities and assets from the IRS.26  Addition-
ally, the charges alleged that UBS bankers marketed their services and 
the benefits of Swiss banking secrecy to clients interested in evading 
United States taxes.27  
Under the deferred prosecution agreement, UBS was required to 
disclose the identities and account information for certain United States 
customers in addition to paying $780 million in fines, penalties, interest, 
and restitution.28  The civil case was also settled between the United 
States and UBS resulting in UBS’ disclosure of information on approxi-
mately 4,450 U.S. customers.29  Following the settlement and deferred 
prosecution agreement, the DOJ pursued criminal prosecution of many 
of the former UBS clients identified by the bank as part of their agree-
ments with the United States.30 
Another landmark of the United States’ fight against tax evasion 
was the 2014 Credit Suisse guilty plea agreement with the DOJ for aiding 
and assisting U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax returns and other 
 
 23. See Troiano, supra note 21, at 334 (“[T]he…summons on UBS was the first time the 
U.S. attempted to pierce Swiss bank secrecy laws to compel a Swiss bank to identify secret 
accounts held by a U.S. citizen.”). 
 24. UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22. 
 25. UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22. 
 26. UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22. 
 27. UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22. 
 28. UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 22. 
 29. Harvey, supra note 20, at 479. 
 30. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Aff., Former UBS Client Pleads 
Guilty to Hiding Assets in Secret Offshore Bank Accounts (Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing the guilty plea of the named defendant for tax felony, as well as eight other 
former UBS clients prosecuted as a result of the agreements with UBS). 
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documents with the IRS.31  The plea agreement required Credit Suisse to 
pay a total of $2.6 billion in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution which 
was the highest payment at the time in a criminal tax case in the United 
States.32  These, as well as other prosecutions by the DOJ as part of the 
Offshore Compliance Initiative,33 led to the classification of the United 
States as a leader in the effort to end tax evasion and tax havens which 
support the tax evaders.34 
In an attempt to combat suspected tax evasion without resorting 
to criminal prosecution, the DOJ announced the Swiss Bank Program in 
August 2013.35  The Swiss Bank Program encouraged Swiss banks that 
believed they had committed tax-related criminal offenses to cooperate 
in the DOJ’s investigations in exchange for non-prosecution agree-
ments.36  Resolutions under the Swiss Bank Program ended in 201637 and 
were deemed by the DOJ to have been a “vital part” of the department’s 
aggressive pursuit of tax evasion.38   
B.       International Standards on Tax Transparency 
AEOI is the new global standard created by the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (“the 
Global Forum”).39  The Global Forum is an international body, made up 
of 153 nations, striving towards the implementation of global standards 
 
 31. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Aff., Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty 
to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns (May 19, 2014) (on 
file with author) (describing the details of the Credit Suisse guilty plea with the U.S.). 
 32. Id. 
 33. The Offshore Compliance Initiative is the blanket term for the DOJ’s tax enforcement 
efforts including prosecutions, the Swiss Bank Program, and other developments. 
 34. See Troiano, supra note 21, at 317 (“the European Union and the United States, have 
led the fight to eradicate tax havens . . . .”). 
 35. United States Dep’t of Justice, Swiss Bank Program (2013), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program (detailing the requirements of participation in the Swiss 
Bank Program including the payment of appropriate penalties and the ineligibility of banks 
already under criminal investigation and all individuals). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. (explaining that the program was not ongoing and that “Swiss banks eligible 
to enter the program were required to advise the department by Dec. 31, 2013, that they had 
reason to believe that they had committed tax-related criminal offenses . . . .”). 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Reaches 
Final Resolutions Under Swiss Bank Program (Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
 39. See OECD, ABOUT THE GLOBAL FORUM, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
(2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/ [hereinafter ABOUT 
THE GLOBAL FORUM]. 
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on tax transparency.40  AEOI requires participating countries to exchange 
the financial account information of non-resident account holders with 
the tax authorities of the account holders’ country of residence.41  AEOI 
also involves the “systematic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ tax-
payer information by the source country to the residence country con-
cerning various categories of income (e.g. dividends, interest, royalties, 
salaries, pensions, etc.).”42  AEOI is intended to work in conjunction with 
the older standard of Exchange of Information on Request (“EOIR”).43  
EOIR allows participating countries to request taxpayer information only 
after demonstrating that it is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the ad-
ministration or enforcement of the domestic tax laws of the requesting 
country.44  AEOI reduces the possibilities for tax evasion by ensuring the 
sending and receiving of pre-agreed information to tax authorities with-
out the need to request it.45  AEOI is intended to allow governments to 
recover lost tax revenue from tax avoiders and to “strengthen interna-
tional efforts to increase transparency, cooperation, and accountability.”46 
AEOI relies on the Common Reporting Standard (“CRS”) to 
standardize the information and procedures for the automatic exchange 
of information.47  The CRS was set out and approved by the OECD on 
recommendation by the Group of 20 (“G20”), “a mix of the world’s larg-
est advanced and emerging economies.”48  The CRS outlines “the finan-
cial account information to be exchanged, the financial institutions 
 
 40. See id. (“Since its restructuring in 2009, the Global Forum has become the key inter-
national body working on the implementation of the international standards on tax transpar-
ency.”). 
 41. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10. 
 42. OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, 
BENEFITS, WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-in-
formation/automatic-exchange-of-information-report.pdf. 
 43. See GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 41; see also Robert Goulder, 
Should the U.S. Adopt the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard?, FORBES (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2016/06/29/should-the-u-s-adopt-the-oecds-com-
mon-reporting-standard/#594f5581744a  (explaining the limitations of EOIR because the 
“country making the request often must possess specific details about the taxpayer in question 
because tax treaties generally prohibit ‘fishing expeditions’”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10. 
 46. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10. 
 47. OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE PORTAL, WHAT IS THE CRS? (2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/; see also 
O’Brien, supra note 11, at 159 (“[T]he [CRS] aims to prevent a proliferation of different due 
diligence and reporting requirements for financial institutions.”). 
 48. G20 MEMBERS, 2015 TURKEY G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2019).  
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required to report, the different types of accounts and taxpayers covered, 
as well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by financial 
institutions.”49  Additionally, the CRS calls on participating jurisdictions 
to gather information from their financial institutions and automatically 
exchange that information with other member nations annually.50 
So far, over 100 jurisdictions have committed to implementing 
the AEOI standard, with the first exchanges beginning in 2017.51  The 
United States is the only member of the G20 that has not committed to 
the AEOI.52  Instead, the United States relies on the 2010 Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).53 
C.       The United States’ Tax Transparency Regulation: FATCA 
As part of the U.S.’ continuing response to the financial crisis of 
2008, FATCA was introduced in Congress in October 2009.54  After sev-
eral modifications, it was passed as part of the Hire Act in March 2010.55  
FATCA “generally requires that foreign financial institutions and certain 
other non-financial foreign entities report on the foreign assets held by 
their U.S. account holders or be subject to withholding on withholdable 
payments.”56  Originally, FATCA was a purely unilateral agreement 
whereby foreign financial institutions wanting to do business with the 
United States agreed to report certain information on U.S. account hold-
ers or otherwise suffer a 30% withholding penalty.57  FATCA did not 
require U.S. financial institutions to exchange information on non-U.S. 
account holders with foreign tax authorities.58   
 
 49. WHAT IS THE CRS?, supra note 47. 
 50. WHAT IS THE CRS?, supra note 47. 
 51. GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10. 
 52. STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 9. 
 53. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012); see also Rose, supra note 17 (explaining the U.S. 
viewpoint that FATCA accomplishes the same objectives as the AEOI and CRS). 
 54. See Harvey, supra note 20, at 482 (describing the background of FATCA). 
 55. §§ 1471–1474 (2012); see also Harvey, supra note 20, at 482 (“Legislation was ulti-
mately introduced in October 2009, modified again in December 2009, and finally adopted in 
March 2010 as part of the Hire Act.”). 
 56. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT, (last 
updated Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/foreign-account-tax-
compliance-act-fatca. 
 57. § 1471(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 58. §§ 1471–1474 (2012); see also Peter A. Cotorceanu, Hiding in Plain Sight: How Non-
US Persons Can Legally Avoid Reporting Under Both FATCA and GATCA, TRUSTS & 
TRUSTEES 1, 2 (Oct. 21, 2015) (“Under the FATCA statute…non-US financial institutions are 
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In response to FATCA, foreign countries saw an opportunity to 
crackdown on tax evasion in their own jurisdictions with the help of the 
United States.59  In exchange for “reciprocal”60 exchanges of information 
with the United States, other governments agreed to allow FATCA re-
porting in their jurisdictions.61  The passing of FATCA in the United 
States and the implementation of local legislation in foreign countries al-
lowing for FATCA reporting “acted as a catalyst for the move towards 
automatic exchange of information in a multilateral context.”62  The in-
ternational standard of AEOI, several years after the passing of FATCA, 
is the result of the move towards multilateral exchange of information.63 
III.  PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IS ESSENTIAL TO 
ESTABLISHING AEOI AS THE GLOBAL STANDARD FOR TAX 
TRANSPARENCY 
The purpose of having a global standard for tax transparency and 
the exchange of information is to ensure that all jurisdictions are on an 
even footing with respect to their taxpayers complying with resident tax 
laws.64  Any deviation from this standard, particularly a deviation from a 
major financial market like the United States, 65 causes a significant prob-
lem for not only tax enforcement, but also in the ability of the OECD and 
Global Forum to gather commitments from other non-participating na-
tions.  This section discusses (1) the reasons why AEOI is more 
 
required to give the US data about US persons. The USA is not required to give anything in 
return.”). 
 59. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 3 (explaining that governments of other countries 
saw an opportunity for a “win-win” if they could convince the U.S. to reciprocate information 
about their taxpayers). 
 60. As will further be explained, “reciprocal” exchanges of information by the U.S. under 
FATCA are not entirely reciprocal. Countries that have reciprocal IGAs with the U.S. do not 
receive the same information on non-U.S. persons as the U.S. does from foreign financial 
institutions about U.S. account holders. 
 61. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58. 
 62. STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 9. 
 63. STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 9; O’Brien, supra note 11, at 159 
(“The CRS…is obviously and admittedly inspired by, and modelled on the FATCA Model 1 
IGAs, but it is reciprocal.”). 
 64. See GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 10 (“The global implementation 
of AEOI is an essential step for stimulating the development of a global level playing field.”). 
 65. See Rose, supra note 17 (describing the United States as “the world’s biggest finan-
cial centre”). 
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comprehensive as a multilateral exchange of information than FATCA,66 
(2) the reasons the United States is unwilling to adopt AEOI,67 and (3) 
how the failure of the United States to participate will ultimately harm 
the global economy.68 
A.       FATCA Does Not Accomplish the Same Objectives as the AEOI 
Although the OECD conditionally accepts the United States’ 
non-commitment to AEOI,69 the United States maintains that it does not 
need to engage in AEOI because FATCA achieves the same results.70  
The reality is the United States receives information about their tax evad-
ers but does not report similar information to foreign tax authorities.71  
Under AEOI, the United States would be required to report that kind of 
information to committed AEOI jurisdictions.72  
FATCA provides that complying foreign financial institutions 
shall “report on an annual basis the information described in subsection 
(c) … in the case of any United States account maintained by such [a 
foreign financial] institution.”73  The information the foreign financial 
 
 66. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (explaining that “until US law is changed to 
mandate [F]ATCA-style reporting, the USA simply can’t agree to the sort of comprehensive 
information exchange [F]ATCA requires.”). 
 67. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5; Rose, supra note 17 (“the U.S. … seems to be taking 
the view that it doesn’t need to engage with the CRS because FATCA does the same job.”). 
 68. Johannesen & Zucman, supra note 3, at 66; GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, su-
pra note 10. 
 69. See AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 7, at n.1. In a footnote to its list of 
committed jurisdictions, the OECD noted that: 
 
The United States has undertaken automatic information exchanges pur-
suant to FATCA from 2015 and entered into intergovernmental agree-
ments (IGAs) with other jurisdictions to do so.  The Model 1A IGAs en-
tered into by the United States acknowledge the need for the United States 
to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange 
with partner jurisdictions.  They also include a political commitment to 
pursue the adoption of regulations and to advocate and support relevant 
legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic ex-
change.  
 
Id.; see also Rose, supra note 17 (commenting on the OECD footnote regarding the U.S. and 
opining that the U.S.’s commitment to advocating for legislative change has “[f]or the time 
being…satisfied the OECD.”). 
 70. Rose, supra note 17. 
 71. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 2. 
 72. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (explaining that the United States would have to 
change its reporting requirements in order to comply with AEOI standards). 
 73. 26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
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institutions agree to report to the United States includes the name, ad-
dress, Taxpayer Identification Number, and the account number and bal-
ance of each account holder “which is a specified United States person.”74  
However, FATCA does not include provisions requiring the United 
States to share the same information about non-U.S. persons with U.S. 
accounts to foreign tax authorities.75 
As a partial solution to the problem of reciprocity, the United 
States entered FATCA intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”) with cer-
tain countries76 detailing what information the United States would give 
those countries in return for their cooperation with FATCA.77  However, 
the reciprocal IGAs are still severely limited in what information the 
United States will share with its partner countries.78  Generally, the IRS 
does not give its reciprocal FATCA partners information about deposi-
tory accounts held by entities, non-cash accounts unless the account earns 
U.S. source income, or information about the controlling person of any 
entity even if the entity is controlled by a resident of a reciprocal coun-
try.79   
The United States cannot give its reciprocal partners certain in-
formation because that information is not currently reported to the IRS 
by U.S. financial institutions.80  Additionally, the United States does not 
have a law mandating the collection of information that it would be re-
quired to report if it joined AEOI.81  The OECD has cited the reluctance 
of the United States to change the law regarding the collection of infor-
mation from financial institutions as one of the reasons for its failure to 
commit to the AEOI.82  However, the countries committed to AEOI were 
 
 74. See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c)(1) (2012) (providing that foreign financial institutions will 
also report “the name, address, and TIN of each substantial United States owner” of an ac-
count holder that is a United States owned foreign entity). 
 75. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 3 (listing the information that the U.S. is not re-
quired to give its FATCA partners). 
 76. Not all countries with FATCA IGAs are classified as “reciprocal” IGAs. See Cotor-
ceanu, supra note 58, at n.7 (explaining that “[s]ome countries do not care to receive infor-
mation from the USA about their residents.”). 
 77. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 3. 
 78. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 3. 
 79. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 3 (explaining the kind of information the IRS does 
not exchange with FATCA partners because U.S. financial institutions do not currently report 
that information to the IRS). 
 80. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (“[M]ost of the data that [F]ATCA requires to be 
exchanged is not currently reported to the IRS by US financial institutions.”). 
 81. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5. 
 82. AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 7, at n.1. 
2019] INTERNATIONAL TAX TRANSPARENCY 241 
required to change or pass new laws that allowed them to collect the nec-
essary data to be reported if they did not already do so.83 
Therefore, FATCA does not accomplish the same goals as AEOI 
because of the limited reciprocity the act allows, and the United States is 
unable to commit to AEOI based on its current legal and financial report-
ing structure.84 
B.         Countries that Are Participating in the AEOI Seek the United                                                                              
States’ Commitment, but Meet Pushback 
Since 2009, the DOJ has led the world in the crackdown on off-
shore tax evasion.85  Therefore, the United States’ refusal to join the 
OECD-led initiative for transnational tax transparency through imple-
mentation of the AEOI and CRS is viewed by some as hypocritical.86   
The European Union,87 Switzerland,88 and Panama89  voiced out-
cry over the failure of the United States to commit and demanded that the 
U.S. play by the same rules as the rest of the world.  One Swiss critic in 
particular stated, “[h]ow ironic—no, how perverse—that the USA, which 
has been so sanctimonious in its condemnation of Swiss banks, has be-
come the banking secrecy jurisdiction du jour.”90  Even tax experts in the 
 
 83. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 6, n.14 (explaining that the U.S. is given a pass 
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 84. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5. 
 85. See Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 EMORY L. J. 655, 660 
(2018) (describing the U.S. attack on tax evasion as “a family of legislative, regulatory, and 
prosecutorial measures to combat offshore tax evasion.”); see also STANDARD FOR 
AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 9 (describing FATCA as “a catalyst for the move towards 
automatic exchange of information in a multilateral context.”); see also The Biggest Loophole 
of All, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.economist.com/interna-
tional/2016/02/20/the-biggest-loophole-of-all (explaining that the U.S. crackdown on tax eva-
sion “sparked a global revolution in financial transparency”). 
 86. See The Biggest Loophole of All, supra note 85 (discussing the controversy and noting 
that some countries have “brand[ed] America a hypocrite”). 
 87. See The Biggest Loophole of All, supra note 85 (“A group in the European Parliament 
argues that, if America refuses to reciprocate fully, it should be hit with a reverse 
FATCA…’We don’t want a tax war, but nor can the US have it all its own way.’”). 
 88. See Enzo de Vicentes, The U.S. Hasn’t Signed the AEoI Agreement: Reciprocity De-
manded, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@icoservices/usa-aeoi-agreement-rec-
iprocity-demanded-868ee4ae3dc6 (“Switzerland . . . demand[s] the U.S. to walk the talk”). 
 89. See The Problem Child: A Tax Haven Professes to Stand on Principle, Risking Pariah 
Status, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.economist.com/interna-
tional/2016/02/18/the-problem-child (explaining Panama’s view that “[s]mall financial cen-
ters . . . are being bullied into accepting competitiveness-sapping rules shunned by…Amer-
ica.”). 
 90. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
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United States have admitted that it is “a little awkward” for the United 
States to have a standard for other countries to comply with that it does 
not adhere to itself.91  There has been little criticism or pressure on the 
United States for its failure to adopt the AEOI from the OECD.92  Some 
analysts suggest that the OECD does not want to antagonize the United 
States because of its power as the leading financial authority and influ-
encer in the world.93 
Many suggest that the United States has no need or desire to par-
ticipate in the AEOI.94  One explanation for the United States’ disinterest 
is that it already receives all the information it wants about U.S. tax evad-
ers from FATCA.95  Another, and arguably more significant explanation, 
is the belief that participation in the AEOI could potentially harm the U.S. 
financial industry, one of the largest sectors of the American economy.96  
Efforts to prevent the United States from participating in more aggressive 
reforms of offshore financing are led by hugely influential lobbying 
groups, which are backed in turn by some of the world’s biggest corpo-
rations.97  Lobbying groups argue that tax evasion reforms invade pri-
vacy, hurt tax competition between countries, and result in expensive 
compliance costs for financial institutions.98  The combination of these 
factors, in addition to the need to change the data collection laws if the 
United States did commit to AEOI, make it unlikely that the United States 
will adopt AEOI.99 
 
 91. See Rose, supra note 17 (quoting U.S. Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for In-
ternational Tax Affairs Bob Stack). 
 92. See Rose, supra note 17 (“Rather than placing the U.S. on the naughty-boy list of 
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 93. See Craig Rose, The EU’s Tax Haven Blacklist – Will the U.S. Eventually be Added?, 
BLOOMBERG LAW: INT’L TAX BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/eus-tax-haven-
b73014472806/ (“the OECD . . . is unlikely to pick a fight with its most important member, 
the U.S.”). 
 94. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5; see also Rose, supra note 17.  
 95. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5. 
 96. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5. 
 97. See Sasha Chavkin, Lobbyists for the Havens: ICIJ’s Guide to the Offshore System’s 
Defenders, INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.icij.org/blog/2013/11/lobbyists-havens-icijs-guide-offshore-systems-defenders/ 
(identifying the major lobbyist groups pushing back against efforts to crackdown on offshore 
tax evasion and naming corporations such as Google, Toyota, and Coco-Cola as members of 
these lobbyist groups). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (“The USA isn’t likely to enter into [AEOI] any 
time soon”). 
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C.         While Becoming a Tax Haven May Benefit the United States 
Individually, Overall It Will Cause Harm to the Global 
Economy and Economic Relationships 
A significant consequence of the United States relying on 
FATCA and refusing to implement the OECD’s AEOI program is the 
reality that, by doing so, the United States is becoming one of the biggest 
tax havens in the world.100  Although there is no universally accepted 
definition of a tax haven,101 the OECD definition relies on four factors: 
(1) no or low tax on relevant income, (2) reluctance to exchange infor-
mation, (3) a lack of transparency or inadequate financial disclosures, and 
(4) foreign entities receive preferential tax treatment without the need to 
establish a “substantial” presence or impact on the local economy.102  As 
the law currently stands, the United States does not collect the requisite 
information for financial institutions that it would need to adequately re-
port tax evaders to their resident countries.103  Opponents of changing the 
U.S. reporting requirements consistently point to the costs of compliance 
with more stringent reporting requirements.104  Due in large part to the 
United States’ unilateral exchanges and limited reciprocal exchanges, 
non-U.S. taxpayers seeking to avoid tax enforcement in their resident 
countries are rapidly moving their assets to the United States.105  Other 
definitions of tax havens include the necessity of stable economic and 
political systems, both of which the United States arguably satisfies.106  
The 2018 Financial Secrecy Index, which ranks jurisdictions according 
 
 100. See Rose, supra note 17 (suggesting that the “U.S. is emerging as a leading tax and 
secrecy haven”); Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5, 13 (calling the United States the “new Swit-
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to the USA to avoid [AEOI] reporting.”). 
 101. See Conor Clarke, What Are Tax Havens and Why Are They Bad? The Hidden Wealth 
of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens. By Gabriel Zucman, 95 TEX. L. REV.  59, 67 (2016) 
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 103. Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5. 
 104. See Chavkin, supra note 97 (expressing the fear of the U.S. Council for International 
Business that “compliance [with OECD reporting standards] would be costly and burden-
some.”). 
 105. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (“[A]ll one has to do to avoide reporting under 
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to their secrecy laws and the scale of their offshore financial activities, 
ranks the United States as second, behind only Switzerland.107 
Despite the duplicitous impression it leaves on the rest of the 
world that the United States is closing its own tax gap through enforce-
ment of FATCA while abstaining from helping other countries achieve 
the same objective, there are many proponents in the United States push-
ing to keep it out of AEOI and also strengthening the country’s secrecy 
standards.108  One analyst draws vague attention to the “chilling effect 
CRS might have on domestic capital formation” and the “incentive for 
foreign capital to flock to U.S. banks” if the United States does not par-
ticipate in AEOI.109 
In contrast, advocates for tax transparency point to the devastat-
ing effects tax havens and offshore financial activity can have on the cit-
izens of both rich and poor countries around the world.110  The Tax Justice 
Network, an international advocacy and research group, estimates that 
“$21 to $32 trillion of private financial wealth is located, untaxed or 
lightly taxed, in secrecy jurisdictions around the world.”111  The problems 
created by tax evasion and offshore secrecy include the distortion of fi-
nancial markets and investments, the opportunity to participate in other 
criminal activities such as fraud and money laundering, and the further 
degeneration of poorer countries due to the loss of tax revenue from the 
wealthy elite.112  Additionally, tax havens and evasion contributed to the 
global financial crisis of 2008, from which many countries are still recov-
ering.113  The creation of a global system targeting offshore tax havens 
remains part of the action plan taken by world leaders following the fi-
nancial crisis to help increase international cooperation in the event of a 
similar financial meltdown.114  For these reasons, the fight against 
 
 107. The Financial Secrecy Index, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (2018), https://www.finan-
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 108. See Cotorceanu, supra note 58, at 5 (explaining that both people in Congress and 
banking lobbyists have an interest in keeping the U.S. from participating in AEOI for fear of 
destroying the U.S.’s competitive advantage). 
 109. Goulder, supra note 43. 
 110. See The Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 107 (describing the ways that offshore 
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 111. The Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 107. 
 112. The Financial Secrecy Index, supra note 107. 
 113. See Sol Picciotto, How Tax Havens Helped to Create a Crisis, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 
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offshore tax evasion continues to be a key policy issue for countries 
around the world.115 
Accordingly, the United States then faces the debacle between 
sacrificing its competitive advantage and leading by example and pro-
moting worldwide fiscal transparency.116  Studies show that tax evaders 
shift their assets from tax haven to tax haven in response to treaties, 
thereby further supporting the proposition that in order for the AEOI and 
its goal of stopping tax evasion to be successful, there must be global 
implementation.117  If the United States values tax transparency for all 
countries over personal economic gain, then it must adopt the global 
framework for automatic exchange.118 
IV.  THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID 
BECOMING A TAX HAVEN 
Many regard the United States as one of the leaders in the fight 
against tax evasion.119  In particular, the U.S. assaults on Swiss banking 
secrecy in the UBS and Credit Suisse cases were seen as major victories 
for tax transparency.120  In those cases the DOJ came down hard on major 
Swiss banks that helped U.S. taxpayers evade taxes by hiding assets in 
offshore accounts and forced the banks to pay billions to the IRS in fines 
and retribution.121  As the first cases of the kind, the United States was 
praised for its ability to pierce the centuries-long fortress that was Swiss 
banking secrecy laws.122  Additionally, the Obama administration pushed 
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for international tax law reform that would help “reduce the amount of 
taxes lost to tax havens.”123  Therefore, the United States’ newfound list-
ing at the top of the secrecy jurisdiction leaderboard coupled with its 
“wishy-washy ‘commitment’ . . . to advocate and support the enactment 
of legislation” that would allow it to participate in the global framework 
of mutual exchange of information should give proponents of tax trans-
parency cause for concern.124 
A.         How the United States Can Implement AEOI, But Why it is  
Unlikely to Do So  
In order for the United States to adopt and implement the AEOI, 
it would be required to amend its current tax law to change U.S. financial 
institutions’ information gathering and reporting requirements to the 
IRS.125  For those legal changes to occur and for the United States to 
demonstrate its willingness to embrace OECD policies, support will need 
to be garnered from the legislative branch, the executive branch, and 
more importantly from the banking industry and lobbyist groups.126  Cur-
rently, gathering such support will prove to be very difficult.127 
The U.S. legislature faced resistance in 2010 when it approved 
FATCA and when FATCA went into effect at the start of 2014.128  There-
fore, an attempt by Congress to approve even more burdensome disclo-
sure requirements by U.S. financial institutions in order to comply with 
AEOI reporting standards could be expected to meet even stronger 
pushback.129  Additionally, FATCA and other rules to prevent tax evasion 
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were urged for and supported by the Obama administration.130  The 
Trump administration has not yet released an official stance on the prob-
lem of tax evasion, however the President’s personal use of aggressive 
tax planning strategies suggests that his administration might not be in-
clined to support regulations that would require more reporting to the IRS 
from financial institutions.131 
Additionally, advocates for the United States adopting the AEOI 
system of tax reporting face the might of the United States banking 
lobby.132  As previously discussed in this note,133 major lobbyist groups 
believe that the AEOI requirements would harm U.S. financial inter-
ests.134  One group specifically lists the “adoption of tax policies that will 
significantly strengthen our global competitiveness” among its tax prior-
ities for the year.135  The argument that more invasive reporting proce-
dures by U.S. financial institutions will harm our tax competitiveness is 
one that is echoed throughout the banking industry.136  U.S. financial in-
stitutions are also extremely concerned with the additional cost of com-
pliance that accompanies more detailed reporting requirements.137  Many 
also argue that the disclosure of financial information to foreign agencies 
and authorities threatens consumer privacy.138   
B.         Why it is in the United States’ Best Interest to Implement AEOI 
It would be in the United States’ best interest to implement AEOI 
for two main reasons. First, IRS results since the implementation of 
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FATCA suggest that it is not working as it was intended.139  One scholar 
suggests that in order for FATCA to be successful, other countries need 
to participate in a “multilateral FATCA regime.”140  Ironically, the AEOI 
satisfies that requirement as it is a mutual exchange of tax information 
between more than 100 countries.141 Additionally, apart from the high-
profile prosecutions and settlements of major banks and tax evaders by 
the DOJ, since FATCA, the IRS has taken little action against taxpayers 
with undeclared offshore accounts and assets.142  A federal report sug-
gests that despite FATCA’s requirement that foreign financial institutions 
identify United States clients and report information on those clients to 
the IRS, the reports from the foreign financial institutions that the IRS 
has received have been disorganized and inaccurate.143  The vast amount 
of paperwork coupled with incorrect identifying information has created 
more work for an agency already plagued by limited resources.144  The 
result is limited recovery of lost revenue.145 
Second, the United States should be mindful of its current repu-
tation as a leader in the fight against tax evasion and the negative conse-
quences that could result from the loss of that reputation.146  In the late 
1990s Switzerland was at the center of a worldwide controversy related 
to accusations that its Swiss bank secrecy laws had been codified to pro-
tect stolen Nazi treasures.147  While perhaps not an entirely accurate rep-
resentation of the motives behind its bank secrecy laws,148 Switzerland 
continues to face criticism for protecting the accounts of clients whose 
money may fund illegal activities and even terrorism.149  If the United 
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States becomes a tax haven with exacting secrecy protections, as it is pre-
dicted to become, then similar accusations and repercussions will likely 
be leveled against the United States like they have been done to Switzer-
land.150 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Tax evasion is not a problem that can be tackled by one country 
alone.151  Nor is it a problem whose consequences are felt only by 
some.152  Tax evasion affects the whole world and is harmful to both rich 
and poor countries alike.153  Therefore, a coordinated global solution is 
the only viable option for truly curbing the crippling problem of lost rev-
enue to offshore tax evasion.154 
The United States has long maintained a reputation for being a 
leader in the global fight against tax evasion.155  Its groundbreaking pros-
ecution of the Swiss bank UBS and others led to claims around the world 
that banking secrecy was finally being brought to an end.156  Additionally, 
with the adoption of FATCA, the United States was again at the forefront 
of initiatives aiming to bring tax evaders to justice.157 
However, after the adoption of FATCA, the United States’ efforts 
to help other countries in their fights against tax evaders began to wane.158  
Its reciprocal IGAs with FATCA partners are halfhearted and lack sub-
stantive information that will help partner countries identify entities and 
individuals using U.S. financial institutions to hide assets.159  Then, when 
the call for a global standard backed by the international OECD was 
made, the United States considered itself exempt.160  Some viewed the 
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United States’ non-commitment as a temporary circumstance that would 
be remedied over time.161  While still others viewed it as another example 
of American exceptionalism.162 
In order for the United States to maintain its reputation as a leader 
in the global fight against tax evasion, it must walk the walk and accept 
the OECD’s Automatic Exchange of Information standard.163  Although 
the United States was ahead of the game with the implementation of 












behind the rest of the major world powers in securing a more transparent 
and less tax competitive future.164  The most critical thing for the success 
of the OECD and its member nations is ensuring the commitment of the 
United States to implementation of the AEOI.165  
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